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The study undertakes a review of essential aspects of the principle of people-
centeredness which is enshrined in the treaty for the establishment of the East African 
Community II (1999) as a key operational principle. The first EAC collapsed in 1977 and 
many analysts blamed the lack of popular support (among other things) for this failure. 
The study seeks to determine the extent to which the partner states are employing people 
centeredness to realize the Community’s ultimate of objective of attaining a political 
federation.  
Based on Article 7 of the treaty, the idea of people-centeredness seems to have 
included both a focus on people-centric development programs as well as a concern about 
popular involvement in the institutions of the EAC II. This thesis, however, discusses 
only the popular involvement in the institutions of the EAC II. I therefore assess whether 
the institutions of the community have granted access to civil society – specifically, 
business, labor and women’s groups – in accordance with Article 7. I also review the 
ways in which the community has tried to involve the people as a whole, in the form of 
polling, and other means of outreach. The hypothesis guiding this study is that without 
inculcating a focus on the people, regional integration is unlikely to lead to the highest 
stage of political federation.  
My findings are: people-centeredness is not the only condition but is a necessary one. 
When properly utilized, it has the potential to not only ensure continued popular support 
to the regional integration project, but also to contribute to the conditions necessary for 
the integration arrangement to remain sustainable. On the other hand, the absence of a 
people-centered element is likely to make the integration moribund in the longer term. 
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                                                      CHAPTER ONE 
                                                Introduction 
This study examines the role of “people-centeredness” in facilitating the success 
of integration in the East African Community (hereinafter referred to as the 
“Community” or alternatively by its acronym - EAC II). Because people-centeredness is 
enshrined in the treaty for the establishment of the EAC II (1999) as a key operational 
principle,
1
 the study undertakes a review of the essential aspects of the principle to 
determine the extent to which it is being employed to realize the Community’s ultimate 
of objective of attaining a political federation.
2
  
Based on Article 7 of the treaty, the idea of people-centeredness seems to have 
included both a focus on people-centric development programs as well as a concern about 
popular involvement in the institutions of the EAC II. In this thesis, however, I will 
discuss only the second factor. I will thus assess whether the institutions of the 
community have granted access to civil society – specifically, business, labor and 
women’s groups – in accordance with Article 7. I will also review the ways in which the 
community has tried to involve the people at large in the form of polling and other forms 
of outreach.  
Examining the impact of people-centeredness on the EAC II integration is 
important as the creation of a political federation is going to affect the lives of more than 
130 million East Africans, currently residing within the borders of the five partner states. 
                                                 
1 East African Community Secretariat, Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community. 
Arusha, Tanzania (2002): East African Secretariat, p.1. 
 
2 Ibid. p.3. 
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The feat will also result in far-reaching economic, socio-cultural and political 
transformations in the entire EAC II region. 
At the same time, while examining the question of people-centeredness within the 
EAC II’s specific framework, it is worth mentioning that the Community’s regional 
integration endeavors are not happening in isolation. They are part of the global and 
continental frameworks, which have remained constant features of inter-state cooperation 
over time since the 19
th
century. Between 1850 and 1890, for instance, Europe adopted a 
loose form of regional cooperation, with industrialization as its driving force. Despite 
those early efforts at regionalism, however, elaborate regionalization only became a norm 
after the end of World War II. This was as a result of an increased level of regional and 




In the case of Africa, the experience of regional cooperation dates as far back as 
the late 1900s. Emanating f rom the ideals of Pan-Africanism, whose ultimate objective 
was centered on how to attain Pan-African unity, contemporary African integration can 
be best traced from the 1960s, following the wide-reaching attainment of independence 
by the majority of African states from European colonialism. At the time, the most 
central question was what would be the best means by which to attain African 
integration.
4
 To that end, although a lengthy debate occurred among the African leaders 
of the time, which led to an initial formation of four informal groups on how to proceed 
                                                 
 
4 Jaime De Melo and Alvin Panagaria, New Dimensions in Regional Integration. New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999. 
   
5. David J. Francis, Uniting Africa: Building Peace and Security Systems. Aldershot, Hampshire, UK: 
Ashgate Publishing Company, 2006, pp.19 -28. 
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with the continental integration project, a collective position on the future of African 
integration was eventually adopted on May 25, 1963, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, when the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU) was born.
5
  
The Addis Ababa Summit of Heads of State and Governments eventually 
endorsed one of the positions on African regional integration, which had been held by a 
group of African leaders, otherwise nicknamed “gradualists” for their advocacy of 
regional economic integration first before considering the attainment of African political 
unity. The gradualist approach was adopted as a compromise position from the various 
viewpoints, one of which, pioneered by Kwame Nkurumah, advocated achieving 
immediate continental unity in the sense of a United States of Africa.  
Tanzania’s Julius Kambarage Nyerere and Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser became 
the most vocal advocates of the gradualist approach. They both shared the view that 
“regionalism [was] an intermediate stage (not and end) to African unity.”
6
 While Nasser 
believed that African unity “could not be achieved overnight,”
 7
 Nyerere strongly 
advocated a “step-by-step approach” as the “driving force for African unity in practical 
terms.”
8
 With the adoption of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, therefore, 
gradual integration of the African countries and peoples was assured.
9
 The OAU, 
headquartered in Addis Ababa, survived until it was transformed into the African Union 
(AU) in 2001, which continues to date. 
                                                 
5
 T.O. Elias, “The Charter of the Organization of African Unit,” The American Journal of International 
Law, Vol.59, No.2, April 1965, p.243. 
6






  T.O. Elias, The Charter of the Organization of African Unity. The American Journal of International 
Law, Vol59, No.2 (Apr, 1965), pp.243-267. 
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 Africa’s gradualist integration project continues through a number of regional 
economic communities (RECs). In fact, according to the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Africa (UNECA), Africa is currently home to 14 RECs, each at a 
different stage of development. In addition, most of Africa’s RECs are overlapping in 
membership across or within their regions, a phenomenon referred to as “multiple 
membership.”
10
 The East African Community (EAC II) is one among those RECs and 
forms the subject matter for this study. The EAC II is a successor to an initial REC of the 
same name (EAC I), formed in 1967 by Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, but disbanded in 
1977. EAC II was formed in 1999.  
From its establishment through to its collapse, the EAC I was widely seen as too 
heavily leader-centered and nationalistic.
11
 As a result, when the EAC II was 
reestablished,  “people-centeredness” was made a major focus.
12
  
This thesis explores whether the old tendency to be leader-centric and to cling to 
sovereignty is still evident within the EAC II states or if there is visibly more progress 
towards people-centeredness, which is considered to be a pre-requisite for success in the 
realization of a political federation.
13
 The study also attempts to examine whether 
institutional mechanisms have been put in place to enable the incorporation of the views 
of the people of East African in the community’s decision-making processes, and if they 
are functioning as envisaged. To contextualize the thesis’s objective, the next chapter 
outlines the study’s research design, including the underlying theoretical framework.  
                                                 
10
 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, Assessing Regional Integration in Africa II: 
Rationalizing Regional Economic Communities. Addis Ababa: UNECA & African Union, p.52. 
11
 Ali S. Mchumo, “An Overview of the EAC,”Seminar for Members of the Tanzania National Assembly. 
Mimeo: Dodoma, Tanzania: February 2003.  
12
 EAC Secretariat, The Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community 1999. Arusha: 




                      CHAPTER TWO 
                                    Research Design 
This study is guided by the following hypothesis: Without inculcating a focus on 
the people, regional integration is unlikely to lead to the highest stage of political 
federation. I operationalize this people-orientation or people-centeredness at both 
institutional and policy levels. I intend to explore how the concept has been implemented 
in the EAC II up to the time of study.  
The Treaty for the Establishment of the EAC 1999, coined the term “people-
centeredness” in order to uphold the ideals of popular involvement of the peoples of East 
Africa as well as the essence of incorporating market forces in regional integration.
14
 
Because the EAC I was not considered people-centered, employment of the concept was 
seen as a necessary facet to enable the EAC II’s navigation of its successive integration 
stages through to the eventual goal of realizing an East African political federation.
15
   
In the treaty, the following was noted in Article 7 as the key objectives for the 
establishment of the community, which appear to be directly linked to people-
centeredness:  
a. Improving the standard of living and quality of life of the people of East 
Africa;  
b. Ensuring balanced, orderly, consistent and fair development in East Africa; 
c. Promoting the active participation and benefit of the people in development;  
d. Enabling the business community and the general public to play a leading 
role; and  
                                                 
14
 Rwekaza Sympho Mukandala and Nestor N Luanda, “Tanzania’s Regional Bilateral and Multilateral 
Cooperation,” Mimeo. Dar es Salaam, University of Dar es Salaam, July 2002, p.7. 
15
 EAC Secretariat (2000), op cit. 
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e. Strengthening and improving the role of women in development. 
People centeredness is therefore defined based on two facets: The first facet 
relates to people-centeredness in terms of programs established to benefit the people 
across the partner states.  In this thesis I deal only with whether the EAC II has paid 
attention to the needs of businesses and women groups in the integration process. I also 
look at the interests of the people at large by reviewing the work of some committees 
established in 2001 to determine whether East Africans were in favor of integration and 
federation.  
The second facet related to the definition of people centeredness is institutional. 
Article 9 of the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community 1999 
especially details the principal structures (or organs) through which the organization 
functions, namely, the Summit, Council of Ministers, Coordinating Committees, Sectoral 
Committees, the East African Court of Justice, the East African Legislative Assembly 
(EALA), the Secretariat, and “such other organs as may be established by the Summit.”
16
 
People centeredness will therefore be manifested if institutional mechanisms are in 
existence to ensure that inputs from non-governmental actors have space for inclusion in 
the work of the EAC II organs. 
I define regional integration as a process. Ernest Haas stands as one of the leading 
proponents of this definition. Haas defines integration as “a process whereby political 
actors in several distinct settings shift their loyalties and political activities towards a new 
center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing nation-
                                                 
16
 EAC Secretariat, Treaty for the Establishment of the EAC 1999, Article 9 (1) (h)., EAC Secretariat, 




 In reality, however, especially in Africa, experience shows that it takes an 
extremely long time for states to navigate through the economic maze of cooperation 
and/or integration, let alone to realize such a political shift. To date, the EAC II continues 
to struggle to implement a customs union, which should have reached a zero-tariff rate as 
early as 2009. Furthermore, it was supposed to have attained a common market by 2012; 
again, this is a feat is yet to occur. 
Another “process” scholar, Hiroshi Kitamura, defines regional integration as a 
process in which attempts are made to create a desirable institutional framework for 
optimization of general economic policy.  This definition is generally applicable but fails 
to address the question of who integrates and how they go about the integration process.  
In this study, therefore, regional integration refers to the process by which states 
in a particular geographical location mutually and voluntarily decide to cooperate, usually 
agreeing to create regional institutions and rules aimed at enhancing cooperation.  As a 
result of their cooperation arrangement, member states that reach such an agreement do 
need also to agree to cede some of their sovereign powers to the supra-national institution 
they create. The aim is to enable the planning and execution of their cooperation as 
mutually agreed in the relevant legal instruments detailing their cooperation.  
 Furthermore, as the process of integration evolves, the objectives of the regional 
arrangement may range from economic to political cooperation. According to past 
experience, the most common trend appears to be that regional integration will follow a 
politico-economic evolutionary path, where commercial endeavors usually become the 
                                                 
17
 Ernest B.  Haas, The Uniting of Europe:  Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950-1957, Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 1958, p.16. 
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means through which broader socio-political, even security, cooperation objectives are 
achieved. However, this path is by no means assured. 
I choose to study only the three founder countries Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda 
instead of the total membership of five (Burundi and Rwanda inclusive) because of two 
main reasons. The first reason is the history of the three countries in creating the now 
moribund EAC I (1967-1977). After the collapse of the EAC I in 1977 the partner states 
agreed to divide their common assets, which they did in 1984.  However, almost 
immediately after signing the assets dissolution agreement, the countries resumed their 
integration efforts anew in 1986.  
The second reason for choosing to limit this study to the three founder countries 
of the EAC II is both the short duration in which Burundi and Rwanda have been 
members of the organization (since 2007) and their (still) lack of influence in the 
community compared to the three founder states. The latter point is centered on their 
geographical locations within the EAC II as well as their population and economic sizes. 
Geographically, both countries are land locked, with a combined land size of 54,168 sq 
km (Burundi’s is 27,830 sq km and Rwanda’s is 26,338 sq km). Such a land size is rather 
small compared to Tanzania’s 947,300 sq km, Kenya’s 580,367 sq km and Uganda’s 
241,038 sq km.  
In terms of the size of their economies, which is a factor affecting their 
contributions to the EAC II Common Market, Burundi’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 
per purchasing power parity, is estimated only at $5.58billion (2012 estimates), while her 
current population size is 11 million (July 2013). Rwanda’s GDP is much larger, standing 
at $17.74 billion (2012 estimates), while she has a population size of 12.1 million (July 
 16 
2013 estimates). However, Rwanda is experiencing an extremely rapid population growth 
rate of 3.0 percent per annum, while at the same time evidencing one of the highest 
population densities in the world (415.5 people per sq km).
18
 With the majority of their 
populations being rural and subsistence agro-based (more than 80 percent), Burundi and 
Rwanda are unlikely to affect the EAC II integration in any significant way for the 
foreseeable future. 
On the other hand, the three EAC II founder states’ statistics and potentials are 
highly interesting. While both Kenya and Tanzania are littoral states on the Indian Ocean, 
Uganda, though landlocked, has a large inland water body (Lake Victoria), which the 
other two countries also share. The country is also confirmed to have large deposits of oil 
reserves, with its GDP (PPP) currently at $51.27billion (2012 estimates) and its 
population size being 34.8 million.
19
 In addition, Kenya’s GDP (PPP) stands at 
$77.1billion with its current population size 44million (July 2013 estimates) and 
Tanzania’s GDP (PPP) currently stands at $28.24billion, with the country also possessing 
proven reserves of mineral, gas and natural gas deposits. The size of Tanzania’s 
population (2012 estimates) stands at 49.5million.
20
 
The movement towards re-establishing the EAC II accelerated from 1986 to 1999. 
But by the time the leaders were signing the treaty to re-establish the EAC II in 2000, 
complaints were already being raised by intellectuals about the lack of participation of 
                                                 
18
CIA Factbook. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rw (July 2013) and 
http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=RWANDA.  
19






the population in the process of integration.
21
 That is why the extent of people-
centeredness in EAC II integration has been chosen as the topic for this study. With the 
predecessor organization (EAC I) having manifested a clear tendency to be more of a 
“leaders’ community” or club, which contributed to its failure,
22
 the founding fathers of 
the EAC II saw the need to enshrine people-centeredness in Article 7 of the Treaty.
23
  
To ascertain whether people-centeredness appears to be facilitative of the EAC 
II’s integration progress, I use qualitative research and some quantitative data from across 
the three EAC II states.  
Theoretical Framework 
My examination of the EAC II integration processes is located within broader 
regional integration theory, which is divided into two major approaches. The first 
classification involves economic integration theories and the second emanates from 
political science and international relations (IR) theories.   
Economic integration theory is premised on the idea that states integrate gradually 
by way of successive economic stages, starting from loose cooperation to more 
consolidated and centralized stages involving the creation of custom unions and common 
markets within the regions concerned. The successive growth stages may then compel the 
integrating states to attain the highest level of interstate cooperation in the economic 
sense, which is attaining monetary union, thus enabling the establishment of a unified 
economic policy-making arena. Economic integration theory starts by dealing with such 
                                                 
21
 Andrew Kiondo, “The people’s involvement in the estabishment of the EAC”, in Sengndo Mvungi (ed),  
The Draft Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community: A Critical Review, Dar es Salaam: 




 EAC Secretariat, The Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community 1999, Arusha: 
Tanzania: EAC Secretariat, 2000, p.14. 
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issues as regional market relationships and trade flows. On the other hand, IR-oriented 
integration theory is grounded in federalist, functionalist/neo-functionalist and liberal 
intergovernmental approaches. 
 
Economic Approaches to Regional Integration 
Economic approaches to regional integration are among the most prevalent in the 
field. In that regard, the effort to build those theories has been quite strong. 
24
 Walter 
Mattli has for instance distinguished two economic approaches, namely, custom union 
theory and economic integration theory.
25
 
Customs union theory 
Customs union (CU) theory is mainly concerned with the elimination of inter-
state trade barriers and the establishment of common import tariff agreements. The 
central principle is that the removal of tariffs would allow states within the regional 
arrangement to benefit from cheaper imports stemming from more efficient industries 
located in another member state. Consequently, “the degree of trade diversion is likely to 
be small, where the members of a union have extensive trade with each other and a low 
common tariff on imports from non-member countries.”
26
  
The greatest value of CU theory is the emphasis on the relationship between trade 
and factors of production, where non-members attract penalties through higher tariff rates 
to protect the CU members’ trade. As a result, there is the likelihood of accruing benefits 
to member states, including economies of scale and intra-regional trade efficiencies. 
                                                 
24
 Walter  Mattli, The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond, London: Cambridge University 
Press, 1990,p p. 25-6.  
25
Ibid, p.27.   
26
 ibid,  p. 32. 
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Among the most prevalent weaknesses of CU theory is that it does not address the 
question of trade diversion from less efficient CU members to more efficient economies 
outside the region. A third state outside the CU might have lower production costs 
compared to the CU members, the result of which would be trade diversion.  As a 
consequence, to ensure that trade from outside the CU does not distort trade within, the 
ideal would be for the countries to join a global customs union, thereby avoiding trade 
diversion as much as possible. Yet the latter scenario is impractical, and so CU theory 
does not provide a wholly satisfactory theoretical basis for the phenomenon of regional 
integration.    
Economic Integration Theory  
Economic integration theory, also known as the “step-by-step” economic theory, 
purports that regional arrangements, while commencing with free trade agreements, 
would move to establish a custom union (CU), at which stage elimination of intra-
regional trade barriers would be effected. In turn, this would lead to the establishment of 
a common external tariff against third states. Consequently, a CU is expected to evolve 




Bela Balassa identifies six different steps through which economic integration 
would usually occur:  preferential trading areas, free trade areas, customs union, common 
market, economic and monetary union and eventually complete economic integration.
28
 
 Andrew Moravcsik argues, especially in comparative reference to European 
integration, that at the commencement of integration, since national preferences take 




 Bela, Balassa, The Theory of Economic Integration. Homewood, IL:  Richard D. Irwin, 1961.  
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center stage, economic interests are the most important catalysts for the process.
29
 This is 
also a position taken by Finn Laursen
30
 who argues that success in the next stages of the 
integration process following the establishment of supranational institutions will depend 
on the combined support (and demand) of the economic as well as the political actors 
across the integrating states,
31
 relative to the respective benefits they deem accruable 
from integration.  
Although the economic approaches to regional integration are good at explaining 
the economic integration stages and the economic and political actors involved, they do 
not deal fully with the role of non- economic factors. In that sense, examination of the IR-
based integration theories is also necessary. 
International Relations Theory 
The Federalist Approach 
 
The focus of federalist theories is the creation of new states, usually through the 
amalgamation of previously existing ones; on a regional basis, the eventual goal is the 
creation of a single state.
32
 Located within the political sphere of regional integration 
theories, federalism de-emphasizes the pull of economic factors as drivers for integration 
and focuses more on the background and historical connectivity of the people who 
integrate. As Chris Brown argued, “one’s view of federalism depends on their [sic] 
historical experiences and culture.”
33
  
                                                 
29
 Andrew Moravcsik,  (1993). Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal 
Intergovernmentalist Approach. Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol.31, No. 4. 
30
 Finn Laursen, (2003). Comparative Regional Integration: Theoretical Perspectives. Aldershot, 




 Chris Brown, Understanding International Relations. (2001). London: Palgrave. 
33
 Ibid.  
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Consequently, the presumption behind federalism is that decisions to federate are 
made by political elites in and across the federating units. Political elites within 
federating states would have to “surrender” their national sovereignty in favor of a 
regional or world government. The states would then be reduced either to limited internal 
autonomy or they would experience total loss of the right to national sovereignty. 
The Functionalist/Neo-Functionalist Approach 
Functionalist/neo-functionalist theories, also originating from political science, 
generally focus on the assumption that regional integration is not intended to replace the 





approach), the state remains supreme over the institutions that emerge out of the 
integration process.  At the same time, neo-functionalist scholars, sharing a belief in the 
gradualist approach argued by their functionalist predecessors, further argue that, 
ultimately, inter-state cooperation will “spillover” into the “less controversial” economic, 
social, and technical areas.
36
  
The assumption is that decision-making relating to politics and sovereignty is way 
too “controversial” for states to be expected to cede easily to any sort of federal or supra-
national entity. However, approaching integration from the economic angle makes sense 
in terms of building political trust and the bridges necessary to eventually become 
politically more region-oriented.   
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With regard to the EAC I, its establishment was done along functionalist lines. 
The partner states, having realized that an EAC federal state was unattainable as had been 
desired earlier by some of the leaders at the time, decided to adopt an integration 
arrangement, which would enable them to cooperate technically and economically. For 
example, region-wide cooperation was launched in the areas of provision of rail and 
airline common services. When it came to the more difficult issue of deepening 
integration towards political federation however, it was impossible to proceed. Even 
today, each country remains mired in its own national circumstances. 
Furthermore, in regards to neo-functionalism, the goal is for the integrating states 
to create supranational institutions. Aiming to ensure efficient functioning of inter-state 
cooperation, neo-functionalism further assumes that the institutions created will result in 
changes to the sovereignties of the participating states. Walter Mattli argued that the 
supra-national institutions, once in place, may have to be granted regulatory powers 




In addition, neo-functionalists argue that supra-national institutions created by 
integrating states are no longer the only actors in integration. Rather, a whole range of 
non-state actors equally interested in the integration arrangements exists, in particular 
civil society and private sector organizations. The relevance of non-state actors is such 
that, at times, they have influence and networking capacities transcending national and 
regional boundaries thereby, at times, exuding abilities to project agendas beyond the 
local or national realms of governments. By leveraging their cross–regional networks 
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with the supranational institutions, non - state actors may also access platforms in order 
to coordinate issues regionally by addressing them at the supra national level.  For that 
reason, Mattli argued that “supra-nationality is now seen as the only method available to 
states to secure maximum welfare.”
38
  
For the EAC II, by virtue of its treaty’s provisions, especially given the founders’ 
intent as expressed in the Preamble, neo-functionalist thinking seems to have informed 
the commencement of the process, namely, proceeding incrementally from the economic 




The federation was viewed as the ultimate end of the integration spectrum, 
although it is not clear what kind of federation was desired. Still, there are clear 
indications of federalist thinking being incorporated as part of the concept of EAC II 
integration. Moreover, when the EAC II is analyzed in terms of institutional creation, it 
manifests ideals borrowed from neo-functionalist thinking. The institutions include 
although are not limited to, the EAC Secretariat, the East African Legislative Council 
(EALC), the Council of Ministers, and the East African Court of Justice (EACJ).  
The EAC II institutions also signify the emergence of some level of supra-
nationality. But, unfortunately, the concept of supra-nationality falls short of explaining 
what usually happens in regional integration, especially when the member states still 
retain their respective sovereign powers to cherry-pick what they can or cannot 
implement at their national levels of preferences, from the regional milieu of integration 
policies and choices. In that case, a theory capable of helping to understand such a central 
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role of state sovereignty in the context of regional arrangements is liberal 
intergovernmentalism. 
The Liberal Intergovernmentalism Theory 
    Liberal intergovernmentalism emerged in the 1990s as a way to explain the 
failures of the European Communities (EC) in the mid-1960s to 1970s. At the time, 
French President Charles de Gaulle had instructed his ministers to not take part in EC 
Council meetings. The prohibition occurred because de Gaulle opposed the EC Council’s 
mode of decision-making by use of the qualified majority vote (QMV). France’s 
argument was that adopting the QMV went against the EC members’ individual rights to 
defend their national interests. In that case, it was argued, a decision reached through the 




De Gaulle’s position led to the EC’s negotiation and adoption of the Luxembourg 
compromise in January 1966. By virtue of the compromise, the EC’s six members 
“agreed to disagree,”
41
 thereby overhauling their former consensual mode of decision-
making in order to accommodate the use of the QMV, but only on major policy issues 
facing the EC as a whole. Thus a rule was passed wherein the member states would get 
the consent of their people before the adoption of a far-reaching longer term decision. In 
addition, the role and diversity of national interests amongst the integrating states were 
reaffirmed, which could lead to diversity in outcomes at the regional institutional level.  
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Thus liberal intergovernmentalism, as a theory, emerged in order to express the 
aggregation of national interests brought to the integration table by each member state. 
Advanced by Andrew Moravcsik,
42
 the theory operates on a three-stage continuum.  
The first stage relates to how each member state brings onto the negotiating table 
its national preferences – deemed necessarily achievable through the regional integration 
arrangement.  The important question here is what informs a state’s national preferences. 
Are they driven, for example, by economic gain or geopolitical influence? Moravcsik’s 
answer was that most national preferences, which catapult states into regional integration, 
are more economic than geopolitical.
43
  By implication, if those preferences are not met, 
which means that a state’s national interest will not be accommodated, then there is 
likelihood that the said member state’s commitment to integration could be in doubt.  
The second stage concerns interstate negotiations, which member states undertake 
during the integration process. Each member state seeks to ensure maximum 
incorporation of its respective national preferences. Referred to as “grand bargaining,”
 44
 
interstate negotiations would be deemed successful by a member state if the principal 
domestic actors see the outcome as such. In addition, member states’ adherence to 
regional regulations are likely to depend on the degree to which each member perceived 
that their national preferences were incorporated at the regional level to their principal 
national actors’ benefit and satisfaction.   
While the outcomes of “grand bargaining” remain crucial to forecasting the 
importance principal actors and groups in respective national settings place on a regional 
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institution, Moravcsik cautions that any efforts by the member states to negotiate 
“package deals” in order to achieve concessions that would enable them to reach set 
regional goals will likely create “domestic losers.”
45
 As a result, states are likely to “limit 
the use of package deals”
46
 when negotiating initiatives aimed to achieve integration 
goals. Consequently, whichever principal national actors influence the process of 
integration for a particular member state, they are bound to impact the attainment of 
regional integration goals from the standpoint of the state concerned.  
The third and final stage, known as “institutional choice,” seeks to explain the 
rationale by which, after “grand bargaining”; member states decide either to “pool” their 
sovereignty or to “delegate” their decision-making powers to the international institutions 
they create.
47
 In the case of the EAC II, pooling of sovereignty occurs via the centralized 
model of decision-making wherein, through the Council of Ministers, the EAC II makes 
policy recommendations for final approval by the Summit of the Heads of State. But 
there is a catch: As Dani Wadada Nabudere argues, such mode of decision-making 
cannot happen without a “political binding force, short of a political union.”
48
  
 The delegation of decision-making powers to international institutions refers to 
the extent member states are ready to allow a regional institution to determine crucial 
elements of the integration process without interference from those member states. In the 
case of the EAC II, the test of whether delegation exists is best applied by determining 
how strongly each member state abides by decisions reached at the regional level, 
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including by the community’s technical organs. In particular, this refers to the roles and 
perceptions, at the national level, of decisions reached in the context of the Secretariat, 
East African Court of Justice (EACJ) or the East African Legislative Assembly (EALA). 
Are those regional institutions capable of reaching binding decisions to which the partner 
states have shown unreserved compliance and seem to be ready to accept penalties in the 
event of proven non-compliance? This question may require further research outside the 
ambit of this study, but it serves to show the importance of member states’ commitment 
to building strong regional institutions in the context of liberal intergovernmentalism. 
For this study, it is important to find out whether people centeredness remains 
central to the EAC II’s integration as emphasized in the treaty and what means of popular 
participation are being employed to implement it. Furthermore, understanding who plays 
the predominant roles in determining integration is likely to shed light on whether the 
EAC II will truly attain its ultimate objective, that of a political federation, which is 
expected to be attained more quickly when the community is people centered. 
Furthermore, by incorporating the role of domestic actors, liberal intergovernmentalism 
theory is likely to provide a useful guide for the analysis of people centeredness. A 
summary of the model is provided in Table 2.1 below.
49
 
Table 2.1: Liberal Intergovernmentalism Theory: Stages for Regional 
Integration  
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Source: Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1998, p.24.  
 
Based on the theory and in line with the concept of people centeredness, we need 
to determine if the people of East Africa are capable of influencing the process of 
aggregation of national preferences to be incorporated at the regional level. In addition, 
indicators should exist to show the people’s role in determining integration outcomes. 
Victor Adetula has, for example, argued that: 
…Regionalism has been a stronger force in East African politics...but its re-
definition in the current context of EAC (II) needs to take consideration of …the 
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Indeed Article VII of the EAC II Treaty enshrines people-centeredness, although 
it adds a condition with which it must co-exist, namely, it must be “private sector-driven” 
in order to become a reality.  
In this chapter, I have examined the theoretical framework informing this study. 
Having examined other related theoretical underpinnings common in the field of regional 
integration, I have come to the determination that the study is best informed by liberal 
inter-governmentalism theory. The theoretical framework underlines the central role of 
domestic actors, whose interests are aggregated by the state and then brought to the 
regional organizational setting. In the next chapter, I examine the contrast between EAC I 
and II, both in terms of the role of people-centeredness and its utility in the possible 
realization of the East African political federation. 
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                                                    CHAPTER THREE  
The Collapse of EAC I and Quick Transformation into EAC II  
In order to contextualize the importance of people-centeredness to the East 
African integration project, it is useful to analyze the reasons behind the collapse of the 
EAC I in 1977. From that vantage point, it may then be possible to find out what may 
have compelled the EAC II founding members to insist on the incorporation of people-
centeredness in the Treaty for the Establishment of the EAC in 1999. Paragraph 4 of the 
Preamble to the EAC II Treaty states:   
…in 1977 the Treaty for East African Co-operation establishing the East African 
Community was officially dissolved, the main reasons contributing to the collapse 
of the East African Community being lack of strong political will, lack of strong 




Also, in paragraph 11 of the Preamble, the Treaty details that the signatories are: 
…Resolved to create an enabling environment in all the Partner States in order to 
attract investments and allow the private sector and civil society to play a leading 




Looking at the context just described, it appears from the outset that the EAC II 
founders envisaged the participation of both the private sector and civil society in the 
process of integration. It is an idea that had not been considered anywhere in the Treaty 
establishing the EAC I. On the contrary, it appears that, at the time, the partner states had 
felt no compunction to have their citizens too involved in the community’s affairs and 
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Overview of Factors Leading to the Collapse of the EAC I 
The origins of the East African Community (EAC) date as far back as 1900. 
Today, the community is composed of five countries – Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, 
Tanzania, and Uganda. The original members of the community, however, were for a 
long time only the three countries of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. This was initially due 
to colonial exigencies, wherein Kenya was a British colony, Uganda a British 
Protectorate and Tanzania initially a German colony (up to 1918) and later a British 
Mandated Territory (from 1919 to independence in1961). Burundi and Rwanda on the 
other hand did not factor into the British regional colonial arrangement because they were 
initially administered by Germany (from 1894 to 1915) and later (from1916 to 1962) by 
Belgium as twin-mandated territories under the League of Nations.
54
  
Administering the three territories under a British “regional” economic structure 
made sense so in 1919, Mombasa (Kenya) was designated the first regional “customs 
collection center.”
55
  Establishing the customs center would also help to consolidate and 
simplify Britain’s access to raw materials for her industries in the territories.
56
 It would 
also guarantee easier and more cost-efficient freighting of raw materials to England.  
There were also other significant economic infrastructural realignments, apart 
from the establishment of the Mombasa customs post. The building of the Kenya – 
Uganda railway in the early 1900s also contributed significantly to a rapid shift in trade 
from Tanganyika’s (now Tanzania) ports, especially Dar es Salaam and Tanga, to 
Mombasa port. Given the fact that up to 1918 Tanganyika was still under German 
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colonial rule, the move to strengthen Mombasa was an important one to the British 
because it helped to curtail competition posed by both Dar es Salaam and Tanga ports.  
Consequently, the British colonial government established an East African 
Currency Board for Kenya and Uganda in 1904. In addition, following Germany’s defeat 
in World War I, the League of Nations gave Tanganyika to Britain as a mandated 
territory. The territories of Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda were eventually conjoined 
into a single customs union in 1919. A common market framework was also created for 
the three territories in 1940, resulting in the free exchange of goods across the three 
territories. A joint East African income tax board also came into existence in the same 
year. 
In 1948, the East African High Commission (EAHC), consisting of the governors 
of the three territories and the East African Legislative Council (LEGCO), bestowed on 
the commission the necessary legal basis for it to attain an international status. The 
EAHC lasted up to 1961 when the East African Common Services Organization 
(EACSO) was established.
57
 In 1963, after attaining their independence, the countries of 
Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika (later Tanzania) signed what is known as the Nairobi 
Declaration. By virtue of the declaration, the partner states pledged to create a political 
federation.  
The federation did not materialize. Some of the causes for its non-establishment 
included a lack of strong political will among the three countries’ political leaders and 
existence of a perception of unequal sharing of the benefits of integration among the 
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 Dani Wadada Nabudere had said that the failure was based on a myopic 
view of “territorial nationalism,” wherein the interests of the ruling elites of the countries 
and those of multinational corporations took center stage over the interests of the people.  
Moreover, especially where the matter of “unequal sharing of benefits” was 
concerned, the countries were left to squabble over the minute economic “crumbs” of 
transfer taxes. They were thus all losers in a multinational corporation-dominated world, 
which exploited all of them. In order to reverse that exploitative tendency, therefore, the 
East African states would be better integrated. Political unity could be one of the most 
feasible approaches to attain that goal.
59
  
East Africa’s leaders, however, were not ready to surrender their territorial 
nationalism, so they quickly ignored the proposal of a political federation that was the 
basis of the Nairobi Declaration.  Rather, the countries resorted to the idea of “balancing 
trade” and “addressing imbalances” through the “distribution of industries which neither 
state owned or controlled, because they were owned by private industry.
60
 To make the 
new decision a reality, the founding fathers signed the Kampala and Mbale Agreements 
of 1964 and 1965, respectively, which aimed mainly at re-allocating the various 
industries, mostly based in Kenya, to the other two countries.  
Kenya would not allow the relocation of any of the industries from within her 
borders as such action would also mean tremendous job losses in the domestic labor 
market while at the same time opening up labor competitions from both the Tanzanian 
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and Ugandan markets, where some of the industries would now be based. To achieve 
economies of scale, the newly relocated companies, finding Kenyan labor to be now 
more expensive, would opt to source from the local labor market.  
Based on those considerations, Kenya chose to not ratify the Kampala and Mbale 
Agreements.  On the other hand, Kenya’s decision to not allow the relocation of some of 
her industrial franchises led Tanzania to apply separate tariffs against Kenyan goods, 
which was uncharacteristic of any regional customs union or common market 
arrangements. Finding out in reality that outright merging of their industrial and 
economic capacities would not happen that quickly, the three countries finally decided to 
sign the Treaty Establishing the EAC I in 1967.
61
 
The EAC I: Short-lived Integration Experiment (1967-1977)  
The Treaty establishing the EAC I immediately entered into force and allowed for 
the immediate operationalization of an East African Common Market (EACM). The 
EACM aimed at achieving a common customs tariff and trade deviation policy, the 
protection of East African intra-regional trade, and increased inter-territorial trade.
62
  
Those three areas of cooperation were crucial in enabling the EAC I to reduce conflicts of 
interest and undue negative competition among its partner states. The states had thus 











                     General Factors for the Collapse of the EAC I 
But the EAC I was short-lived as it only took a decade to collapse (in 1977). 
Rwekaza Mukandala and Nestor Luanda have summarized the reasons for its collapse as 
follows: (a) the existence of different political philosophies (which in turn led each 
country to pursue different economic policies); (b) a violent change of government by 
military coup in Uganda in 1971; (c) continued perception by elements of the leaderships 
in both Tanzania and Uganda that Kenya maintained an unfair advantage over the other 
two members, resulting into inequitable sharing of the benefits of integration; (d) a lack 
of policies capable of ensuring harmonization of the integration process in general; and 




As regards the differences in the three countries’ political philosophies, Kenya’s 
capitalist-oriented economy was different from Tanzania’s declared “socialism and self-
reliance” and Uganda’s “common man’s charter.”
64
 Essentially, Uganda’s policy was 
both quasi-capitalist and socialist driven.
65
 Apparently, the different economic foci not 
only reflected diverse macro and micro-economic policy frameworks but also contributed 
to the drift, experienced by the three countries, away from deeper integration. 
On the political front, Tanzania’s Julius Nyerere had great distaste for General Idi 
Amin Dada following the latter’s violent overthrow of President Milton Obote in 1971. 
President Obote was Julius Nyerere’s personal friend, which ensured that he would never 
sit with Amin at any EAC I summit meeting. Personality clashes between Nyerere and 
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Amin eventually led to war between Tanzania and Uganda from 1978 to 1979. The 
immediate cause of the war was Uganda’s annexation of part of Tanzanian territory in the 
Northwestern Kagera Region, but it eventually resulted in Tanzania’s overthrow of the 
regime in Kampala.
66
 By that time, General Amin had fled the country and abdicated 
leadership for good.  
The favorable conclusion of the war on Tanzania’s side allowed for the 
reinstatement of Milton Obote in 1979, but could not save the community from its 
collapse.
67
 As a result of the Nyerere-Amin standoff, the EAC Summit could not convene 
from 1971 to 1977. By that time, the drums of war between the two countries had already 
reached their crescendo.  
In addition, given the organization’s top-down, command-oriented mode of 
decision-making, no major activity would be allowed to take place, whether in terms of 
budgetary appropriations or any policy-oriented initiatives. It was only a matter of time 
before the members officially acknowledged their organization’s collapse.  
As regards the perception about inequitable distribution of the benefits of 
integration in favor of Kenya, this was rooted in the pre-independence era. It will be 
recalled that, of the three countries, Kenya had been favored by the British colonial 
administration in 1919 when Mombasa became the customs center and its port the hub of 
British export/import trade on the East African coast.  
Recognizing that imbalance from the inception of the community in 1967, the 
partner states introduced specific mechanisms in the region’s trade regime, which were 
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intended to reduce Kenya’s industrial advantage over Tanzania and Uganda.
68
 Among the 
mechanisms adopted was the establishment of a transfer tax system, which was intended 
to benefit Tanzania and Uganda by boosting their industrial competitiveness with Kenya. 
The transfer tax, it was thought, would encourage the development of manufacturing 
industries in the two countries and help to protect their markets against Kenyan goods.
69
   
The result however was different. Instead of benefitting the two countries, the tax 
transfer system brought about a negative impact on Tanzanian and Ugandan industries. 
Mohabe Nyirabu points out that, rather than bolstering industrial development in the two 
countries, the transfer tax policy at best only allowed for a mushrooming of small to 
medium scale industrial units. In addition, the industrial units operated at comparatively 
higher costs than the larger and more advanced units in Kenya. This then resulted in trade 
diversion instead of trade creation for Tanzania and Uganda, leaving Kenya to retain a 
manufacturing and commercial edge over the other two, who remained underdogs.
70
 
Lack of People-centeredness as a Key Factor for the Collapse of EAC I 
Lack of people-centeredness has been mentioned widely in the literature on EAC 
I integration as among the principal factors for the organization’s collapse in 1977.
71
 The 
general argument here is that, the organization was not rooted in popular legitimacy. It is 
thus assumed that, had popular support existed from the inception of the EAC I, the 
political leaders would have had to reconsider any possibilities likely to lead to its 
collapse. That is because any political arrangement with popular support from the people 
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is likely to penalize politicians who make it fail and to reward those who make it succeed. 
Whereas penalties may be made manifest by election losses, rewards may be measured 
simply by the re-election of politicians who succeed.  
Because the EAC I had come into existence solely based on the whims of the 
three countries’ political leadership instead of being based on popular support from 
across the population, there were no penalties to be expected from the electorate. On the 
contrary, it seems that the political leadership had unabridged powers to decide on the 
fate of the EAC I – whether in a positive or negative direction, thereby completely 
ignoring any role for the people. Dani Wadada Nabudere has argued that, “people-
centeredness” was not even a concept to be considered when the EAC I founders created 
the organization in 1967.
72
  
Much of the rationalization for people-centeredness is deeply linked to the history 
of East African societies on the one hand, and Western European colonialism on the 
other. Thus, although in the pre-colonial era the societies and peoples of East Africa were 
traditionally interlinked in almost synonymous societies spanning present-day borders, 
the colonial borders which the EAC states inherited from their British former colonizers 
also completely distorted the pre-colonial borderless status.    
Following the drawing of artificial boundaries at the Berlin Conference in 1884-
1885 in what constituted the “Scramble for Africa,” ethnic groups spanning the imposed 
borders such as the Luos and Maasai in Kenya and Tanzania were mercilessly divided 
into communities within the different countries.  To date, the border peoples of East 
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Africa continue to cross the borders, without recourse to or care for visa or immigration 
requirements. Had the populations across the EAC partner states been comprehensively 
involved in the integration processes, it is likely that EAC I integration might have been 
more people-supported than merely seeming to be the work and drive of the EAC 
governments. 
 Mukandala and Luanda point out that the lack of strong participation of civil 
society and the private sector in the cooperation activities contributed to the collapse of 
the EAC I in 1977.
73
 In fact, the two authors note that the lack of popular participation of 
the people of East Africa was so profound that the majority of East Africans remained 
indifferent to the disintegration of the EAC I, even as it reached its official demise in 
1977.
74
 In essence, that indifference appeals almost to some form of common sense: why 
would the population be concerned with the plight of an organization in which they had 
no stake?  
In terms of decision-making, the Summit centralized the organization’s processes, 
ideally based on recommendations from the Council of Ministers and the Secretariat, 
respectively, but almost solely based on the presidents’ personal wishes. As a result, the 
East African Legislative Assembly (EALA) was merely a consultative organ, rather than 
an authoritative legislative entity, as it ought to have been. As such, the Council of 
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Based on the preceding analysis, it is no surprise that even the articles for the 
dissolution of the EAC I were not submitted to the EALA for deliberation. That lack of 
popular involvement, even at the representative democratic level of the EALA, also 
serves to highlight the point that the organization remained leadership-centered. Thus, 




The EAC II: Rapid Transformation of an Old Integration Idea 
Following the collapse of the EAC I and after a transition period in which the 
partner states negotiated and reached agreement on the transfer of common assets, a 
process which was completed in 1984, an EAC II was re-established in 1999.The re-
establishment was a significant event in that it provided an opportunity to ensure that the 
problems experienced in the EAC I would not recur in the new arrangement. These 
included the inherent lack of a unified vision for development which had afflicted the 
EAC I.  
However, it is interesting that a similar lack of unified vision for joint regional 
development seems to persist to date within the context of the EAC II. Jacqueline 
Braveboy-Wagner notes, “the EAC II is perhaps the most ambitious political and 
economic program of the RECs, but lingering political differences and differing levels of 
development are still obstacles to rapid progress in integration.”
77
 Looked at in the 
context of its predecessor, that “most ambitious of Africa’s RECs” known as EAC II is 
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In Article 5.2 of the EAC II Treaty, the partner states expressed their will to 
achieve a federation. The EAC Development Strategy (2006 – 2010) included a focus on 
facilitating the process towards the realization of a political federation. Evidence related 
to the continued desire for the federation is reflected in some of the political leadership’s 
official undertakings. For example, by a decision made at their summit in Nairobi on 27–
29 August 2004, the EAC II’s heads of state expressed a collective “concern at the slow 
pace of integration,”
79
 and decided to form a “Committee on Fast Tracking the EAC 
Political Federation.”
80
 Also dubbed the “Wako Committee” due to the name of its Chair, 
the Committee was charged with carrying out region-wide consultations among East 




The Wako Committee submitted its report to the regular summit meeting of the 
EAC Heads of State in Arusha on 29 November 2004. Among its recommendations was 
a blunt admonition to the (EAC II) heads of state that they would do better to refrain from 
attempting to forge a “leadership-driven federation.” Rather the committee advised that 
the organization needed to become more citizenry-driven in order to reach the political 
federation goal. Thus, the committee argued in part that: 
                                                 
78
 EAC Secretariat, Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community 1999. Arusha: EAC 
Secretariat, 2000. 
79
 EAC Secretariat, Towards and East African Federation. Retrieved from 
http://www.eac.int/politicalfederation/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=50&Itemid=109 




 EAC Secretariat, Summary Report of the Committee on Fast-tracking East African Federation. Arusha, 
EAC Secretariat: 2004, p. 2. Retrieved from 
http://www.eac.int/politicalfederation/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=50&Itemid=109 
on March 09, 2012. 
 42 
…A sound foundation is needed to create a sustainable Political Federation. One 
contributor to such sustainability requires that the process towards Political 
Federation be reached through public mobilization pressure rather than through 
executive decisions…A public referendum process is desirable, since large 
numbers of the people of East Africa have stated very clearly that they want not 
only to understand what a Federation is, but also own it and participate in its 
formation…The process…will partly depend on the design and implementation of 
the strategic interventions during the period prior to the establishment of a 
Federation, and partly on the involvement of the people of East Africa, including 





 The Wako committee’s findings were an initial eye-opener concerning the 
prospects of incorporating a “people-centered” approach to attain the political federation. 
The problem with that report, however was that it fell short of exploring or suggesting 
what avenues would be useful to ensure the popular participation of EAC II citizens in 
order to foster people centeredness. As such, that lack of guidance did not expand the 
rationale for implementing people-centeredness to the benefit of EAC II integration. For 
that reason, further guidance could be obtained from Article 7 of the EAC II Treaty, 
which details the key objectives for the establishment of the Community as being, inter 
alia:  
a. Improving the standard of living and quality of life of the people of East 
Africa; 
b. Ensuring balanced, orderly, consistent and fair development in East Africa; 
c. Promoting the active participation and benefit of the people in development;  
d. Enabling the business community and the general public to play a leading 
role; and  
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e. Strengthening and improving the role of women in development. 
A number of these objectives are directly linked to people-centeredness; they 
include although may not be limited to, active participation and benefit of the people in 
development, allowing the business community and general public to play a leading role 
in the community’s affairs, as well as improving the role of women in development.  
What is important is that, the EAC II treaty appears to be specific on the potential people-
centeredness may have in EAC II integration. However, the zeal to allow that to happen 
has been missing. This is a view also expressed by Andrew Kiondo, who argued that 
involvement of the people in integration was not among the organization’s strongest suits 
even during the commencement of EAC II integration.
83
  
In this thesis, I am therefore interested in objectives c, d and e, above, in line of 
Article 7 of the treaty. In the next chapter I explore my first question: What institutional 
mechanisms are in place within the EAC II’s decision-making processes, which would 
require incorporation of the views of the East African peoples? And, if such mechanisms 
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                                             CHAPTER FOUR 
EAC II Decision-making Mechanisms  
This chapter examines EAC II institutions to assess the extent to which the 
organization’s institutional decision-making mechanisms are designed to allow for the 
input of civil society. If there are no such mechanisms then, despite the importance 
people centeredness is accorded in the EAC II charter, the idea should be regarded as 
rhetorical instead of concrete. 
EAC II Institutional Structures  
An organization’s institutional structures and how they relate to its functioning 
and sustainability could be important indicators enabling one to gauge that organization’s 
ability to achieve its objectives. In the case of the EAC II, Article 9 of the Treaty details 
the principal structures through which the organization functions.  Those structures (or 
organs) of the community are:  the Summit, Council of Ministers, Coordinating 
Committees, sectoral committees, the East African Court of Justice, the East African 
Legislative Assembly (EALA), the Secretariat, and “such other organs as may be 
established by the Summit.”
84
  
The Summit and its Omnipotent Decision-making Powers 
 The Summit is the final, hence most powerful decision-making organ of the EAC 
II. It thus retains its place “at the heart”
85
 of the EAC II just as was the case during the era 
of the EAC I. The summit is where the EAC II heads of state meet in order to give overall 
direction to the organization. As such, the organ has sweeping powers on virtually 
everything that concerns the working and continuing existence of the EAC II.  
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For example, by virtue of Article 9 (1) (h) of the treaty, the Summit is the sole 
organ mandated to create subordinate institutions in the EAC II. This is a function the 
Summit can carry out, as it deems appropriate, without any limitations. Similarly, Article 
11 alludes to the Summit’s omnipotent powers of appointment and removal of judges of 
the East African Court of Justice, without recourse to any other body. Article11 too 
provides that the Summit admits new members and/or grants observer status to foreign 
countries, just as it must also assent to (or dissent on) bills that may have been passed by 
the East African Legislative Assembly (EALA).
86
  
  The significance of the Summit’s unilaterally sweeping powers (without 
democratic safeguards to put them in check) is that, it literally counteracts the treaty’s 
declared objective of establishing a people-centered EAC II. This concern is further 
reinforced by the consensual mode of decision-making employed by the Summit in line 
with Article 12(3) of the treaty. The treaty provision clearly states that the Summit shall 
“reach its decisions by consensus.”
87
  
To optimize its decision-making, the EAC II could benefit from the experiences 
of the European Economic Community (EEC), which initially also utilized the consensus 
mode of decision-making. In 1966, President Charles de Gaulle instructed all French 
delegates to the EEC to oppose all measures being debated until the membership agreed 
to a better mode of decision-making other than consensus. De Gaulle’s belief was that 
France would be short-changed if she deemed a measure was important to her national 
interests but smaller states did not feel as strongly about it. At the same time, smaller 
states in the EEC could be disadvantaged by bigger states if the latter banded together to 
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pass a measure more advantageous to them than to the former. In the end, it was apparent 
that the consensus mode of decision-making risked organizational sustainability.
88
 
The EEC eventually adopted both the qualified majority vote (QMV) system in 
order to safeguard the interests of smaller states, and the veto power to thereby 
accommodate interests across the membership, taking into account France’s eminently 
pro-integration political stance, and the need to ensure that regional interests already 
achieved would not be regressed.
89
  
The EAC II can hardly claim to be impervious to similar challenges as the EEC 
faced more than 40 years ago. This reality becomes apparent when one or more of the 
rest of the membership appear to be obstructionists. For example in June-August 2013 
three of the Community’s member states, Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda,
90
 decided to 
move forward with a cross-border railway infrastructural construction project ending up 
at Mombasa Port, thereby likely to undermine Tanzania’s ports, rather than linking them 
with the rest of the region. Although Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda had cited the principle 
of “variable geometry” enshrined in Article 7(3) of the EAC II Treaty as the justification 
for moving forward without Tanzania and Burundi, authorities in Tanzania argued that 
the cited provision of the treaty only allowed for flexible implementation of some aspects 
of integration variously by member states, and that such allowance did not extend to only 
a few of the member states establishing “coalitions of the willing” to decide on major 
EAC II decisions without the consensus of the other members.
91
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Where people-centeredness is concerned, the Summit’s omnipotence in decision-
making does not provide room for the “people” of East Africa to counteract their heads of 
state especially when the latter seem to be making controversial decisions that the people 
may wish to reverse. Non-governmental organizations, professional associations and the 
East African Bussiness Council (EABC) are not allowed observer status at the Summit 
level meetings and other senior decision-making and bureaucratic/advisory meetings. 
However, Civil society and business communities may hold debates and non-
governmental sector-oriented consultations on particular areas of integration and formally 
submit reports to the Secretariat for conveyance to the partner states.  
For example, on March 8, 2014, the East African Law Society (EALS) formally 
filed Case Reference No.1 of 2014 in the EACJ against the Government of the Republic 
of Burundi. In the lawsuit, the EALS bemoaned allegations of extrajudicial killings and 
persecution of the political opposition in Burundi, which the EALS argued amounted to 
the Government’s violations of its obligations under Articles 6(d) and 7(d) of the EAC II 
treaty. The provisions require that the partner states abide by the principles of good 
governance, adherence to the rule of law, and social justice as well as adherence to the 
principles of human rights.
92
 The EALS has therefore requested the EACJ to compel the 
EAC Secretary-General to “evaluate and advise on whether Burundi [was] still in 
consonance with those fundamental principles that underpinned the EAC.”
93
 Although 
the case remains on-going in the EACJ, a guilty finding against Burundi could entail 
adoption by the Council of Ministers and Summit of the EALS proposal to allow 
application of sanctions, against Burundi by the other partner states, under Articles 146 
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and 147 of the treaty. It could also create a precedent with regard to actions civil society 
actors in the EAC II can undertake to enable them to actively participate in the affairs of 
the community. The role of civil society is discussed further in the last section of this 
chapter.  
The Council of Ministers 
The Council of Ministers plays an important policy-setting role. It consists of the 
ministers responsible for regional integration from each partner state. Like the Summit, 
the Council is fully “state-centric” in that it does not involve any actors outside the 
executive branch of member states in its deliberations. The Council also provides support 
and monitors implementation of its decisions in the national context across the partner 
states. It also prepares legislation to be tabled in the East African Legislative Assembly 
(EALA).  
Ultimately, the Council must report and submit its recommendations to the 
Summit for approval. In addition, all the sectoral committees detailed in the treaty must 
follow a similar approval process. However actors outside the executive realm of 
governments cannot present their views to the council. 
The East African Court of Justice 
The East African Court of Justice (EACJ) is one of two organs of the EAC II 
(together with the East African Legislative Assembly -EALA) which have a better chance 
to showcase the incorporation of people-centeredness into the community. Charged with 
ensuring “adherence to the law in the interpretation and application of and compliance 
with [the] Treaty,”
94
 the EACJ is supposed to be autonomous from the partner states in its 
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work. However, a number of legal bottlenecks present challenges to the functioning of 
the institution. Those challenges beg the question of the extent to which the judicial 
autonomy of the EACJ can be safeguarded. Three main characteristics relate to this. I 
analyze each of them in detail below. 
Firstly, under Article 24 (1) of the Treaty, the judges of the EACJ are directly 
appointed by the Summit, without recourse to consultations with either professional 
organizations or parliaments of the partner states they come from. As a result, given the 
lack of oversight in the appointment process, there is likelihood of cronyism. The judges 
remain accountable to their heads of state, which then begs the question of guaranteeing 
judicial independence, given that the justices remain answerable to their respective 
national appointing authorities. This challenge is further compounded by the fact that, 
despite their being appointed to serve on the EACJ bench, the judges still retain their 
respective national judicial positions. This is a recipe for conflict of interest, especially 
when judges are asked to rule against their primary employers, i.e. the national 
governments.  
Secondly, when the partner states enacted the EAC II Treaty, they slipped in a 
number of claw-back clauses, some of which the EACJ has had to rule against as being 
contrary to the spirit and objectives of the treaty. The relevance of this argument is well 
documented in the EACJ’s landmark ruling in the case of Prof. Anyang’ Nyong’o and 10 
others v. the Attorney General Kenya, the Clerk of the EALA, and the Secretary-General 
of the EAC and 4 others (interveners) 2006.
95
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The circumstances of the case were that the claimants alleged to the Court (EACJ) 
that Kenya’s nine Members to the East African Legislative Assembly (EALA) in 2005 
were elected from only one political party, which contravened the spirit of Article 50(1) 
of the EAC II Treaty. The treaty provision requires EALA members to be elected from as 
wide a national representational spectrum as possible, ranging from across a nation’s 
political parties represented in parliament, including various opinion, gender, and special 
interest groups according to procedures set by each partner state’s parliament.
96
  
The claimants requested that the Court strike down said presidential 
appointments, as they were null and void, and order the Government of Kenya to elect its 
members to the EALA from parliament, as was the practice in the other partner states.  
The case involved the Clerk of the EALA and Secretary-General of the EAC because 
they had already accepted the appointees as Members of the EALA. During his 
submissions to the Court, the Attorney-General of Kenya, as Respondent in the case, 
pointed to the jurisdictional limits of the EACJ enshrined in Article 27(1) of the EAC II 
Treaty, which refers to the EACJ only as a Court of initial jurisdiction.
97
 Consequently, in 
the opinion of the Kenyan Government, the EACJ had no jurisdiction in the matter at 
hand, which was to be deemed as inherently within the domestic purview of the EAC II 
partner state.  
In its determination, the Court indeed agreed that Article 27 (1) of the EAC II 
Treaty was attempting to limit its powers by declaring that the Court “shall initially have 
jurisdiction over the interpretation and application of [the] Treaty.”
98
 Thus the use of the 
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term “initially” in Art.27 (1) left the implication that “final” jurisdiction over the 
provisions of the treaty rested with the national courts of the partner states rather than the 
EACJ as an ideal referral court. As a matter of jurisprudential premise, however, the 
Court invoked its jurisdiction based on the tenets of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties 1969 to which all the EAC II partner states are signatories. Accordingly, the 
EACJ called for uniform application of all (EAC II) treaty provisions by the partner states 
because they all had uniform stake in the organization.
99
 At least in the specific case 
under reference, the Government of Kenya eventually reversed its decision and 
eventually implemented the Court’s decision a couple of years later. 
In accordance with articles 26 and 27 of the Vienna Convention 1969, the EACJ 
also required the partner states to observe two key principles enshrined in the 
Convention: The first principle is that of pacta sunt servanda (i.e. agreements, once 
made, must be respected). The second principle the Court required the partner states to 
observe was the prohibition that “no party to a treaty shall invoke its internal laws as 
justification for not observing or failing to perform the obligations it entered into under 
the treaty.”
100
 The basis of the latter argument was rooted in Article 31 of the Vienna 
Convention, which stipulates that treaty interpretation has to be based “on good faith” 
and in accordance with the “ordinary meaning, object and purpose”
101
 of the treaty. 
The EACJ also took issue with Article 50 of the EAC II Treaty. The Article 
provides for the election of the members of the EALA but leaves open the manner in 
which the national assemblies in the respective partner states would carry out the 
elections. In the Court’s opinion, the partner states needed to make a conscious decision 
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to cede some of their sovereign powers to the broader regional interest. This would 
enable the partner states to submit uniformly to a common set of regional legal standards 
where the EACJ would have jurisdiction.  
To-date, the landmark EACJ ruling just explained has not been domesticated by 
any of the partner states, a reality also observed by Stefan Reith and Moritz Boltz who 
said in 2011 that, it was rather an unfortunate omission that no partner states’ national 
courts had been able to refer to the important precedent set by that EACJ ruling.
102
 
Where people-centeredness is concerned, this is one area where the influence of 
professional associations such as the East African Law Society and the national law 
societies in each member state as well as NGOs could have provided much needed 
pressure on the governments to better observe the rule of law. This would include 
ensuring that the partner states’ governments honor the rulings of the EACJ as ordered. 
To-date, the much-lamented EACJ jurisdictional state of affairs remains, requiring 
change from within and across the partner states. 
The East African Legislative Assembly (EALA) 
Established under Chapter 9 of the EAC II Treaty, the EALA should be the most 
people-centered institution of the community. The institution has however been said to 
“lack much popular legitimacy and input from civil society.”
103
 Also it lacks any 
significant influence over the partner states’ governments’ decisions regarding the 
process of integration. For example, although the EALA passes laws, most of the bills 
brought to its floor come from the Council (of Ministers) while only a minority of the 
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bills comes privately from the legislators. In addition, given the lack of a regionally 
binding legal system embodied in the EACJ, the EAC II governments have unmitigated 
freedom to cherry-pick from the legislation the EALA adopts.  
The composition of the EALA is set under Article 48 of the treaty, to be nine 
members from each of the partner states. The general election criteria are set in Article 
50(1),namely that the members are to be elected by the respective national parliaments 
“not from among the members” and that the elections be as broadly representative of the 
country’s population, political parties, gender and special interest groups as possible. But 
uniform procedures for those elections do not exist.
104
 This is a source of national 




At present it is still difficult for the EALA to play a role significant enough to 
legally call on the accountability of the governments, because its members’ lack linkage 
to the national electorates, hence the people of East Africa. The election procedures need 
to be amended to ensure that EALA candidates are either elected directly by their 
national electorates so they would report to them or, if elected by the national parliaments 
as is currently the case, then they should be able to report to the parliament in as regular 
and transparent manner as possible. This will have the advantage of making the EAC II 
integration agenda more of a matter for national debate and public involvement.  
 
                                                 
104
 EAC Treaty 2000, p.42. 
105
 The Monitor Newspaper, Uganda. “EALA elections: The ruling party’s argument on numbers is 
superficial,” May 25, 2012. A case similar to the Kenyan one deliberated on by the EACJ in 2006 on the 
basis of representational imbalances also occurred in 2012 in Uganda, where the government sought to 
send to the EALA 7 of the 9 members from the ruling NRM party and 2 from one opposition party, even 




Overview of people-centeredness in the EAC II’s institutional decision-
making processes 
In sum, where the functioning of the EAC II’s principal organs is concerned, 
credible evidence does not so far exist to show that the organization’s institutional 
decision-making processes benefit in any regularized fashion from incorporating the 
people’s views. Civil society organizations are unable to send reports to the Summit 
directly, although they can hold debates and make recommendations to other organs. 
Also, although the EAC parliament is representative to some degree still no formal 
mechanisms exist that would enable wider participation of civil society or the people at 
large in the election of their representatives to the EAC parliament. 
Thus, given that absence of such linkages between most of the EAC institutions 
and the people, it is not surprising that J. Oloka-Onyango’s concludes that the mere 
mention of people-centeredness in the EAC II Treaty does not in any concrete way 
constitute popular participation.
106
 The reality seems to be that, the organization’s 
decision-making mechanisms, as well as its survival, continue to remain firmly in the 
hands of the EAC political elite, in particular the Executive Branch, whose role is 
epitomized by the Summit. For that reason, Oloka-Onyango’s answer to the title of, 
“Who Owns the East African Community?”
107
 is that the traditional “strong leaders’ 
ownership” of the community, which so tragically dogged the EAC I, seems to have been 
carried over into the EAC II.  
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The East African Business Council as Representative of the Private Sector 
The East African Business Council (EABC) is the umbrella organization 
representing the private sector within the EAC II region. The EABC was established in 
1997 and comprises a variety of member organizations in the region. They include 54 
Associations and 102 corporate members.
108
 The association members of the EABC, 
include: “all National Private sector apex bodies, four manufacturing associations, five 
Chambers of Commerce, three Employer Associations, two Women Associations, two 




The EABC does not, however, seem to have any formalized way to influence 
EAC II policy or strongly lobby the partner states’ governments to deliver on their treaty 
obligations, both for people-centered and private sector driven integration. A report on 
January 26, 2014, alluded to the EABC’s own frustrations with attempting to influence 
developments within the EAC II towards deeper integration. The report laments that the 
EAC II governments have not implemented protocols they have already signed and 
ratified. These include the implementation of a single EAC tourist visa, abolishing 
working permits across the member states, and abolishing all non-tariff barriers to trade 
and industrial production. The partner states have not also allowed the use of national 
identity documents (IDs) for their citizens as they travel within the region; rather national 
passports are still required of EAC travelers.
110
 As recently as January 2014, the EABC 
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was still planning to lobby the respective EAC presidents individually, country to 
country, to ask them to speed up the process of regional integration.
111
  
Looking at all the hurdles in the area of business that the EABC continues to face, 
it is worthwhile to note that the organization was established (in 1997), so it was already 
in operation by the time the EAC II treaty was signed in 1999. That it is still unable to 
have formal lobbying mechanisms in place, capable of influencing decisions at the 
national and EAC-wide level in favor of the business community speaks to its still 
nascent capability to engage within the EAC in a manner beneficial to its member 
organizations’ interests. The EABC provided inputs during the making of the EAC II 
treaty, hence the recognition of the role of the private sector in the community’s 
integration processes. In fact, the framers of the treaty accorded that role much 
importance by enshrining it in Article 127(1b) of the treaty, which states clearly that: 
“…The partner states agree to provide opportunities for entrepreneurs to participate 
actively in improving the policies and activities of the institutions of the community that 
affect them.”
112
 How the EABC has ended up not being central to the EAC II’s decision-
making is the subject of another research study. The reality is however that business is 
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Gender Groups, Civil Society and Community Based Organizations’ (CBOs) Roles 
in EAC Institutional Mechanisms and Processes 
 It is rather curious that the EABC lists gender groups among its member 
organizations, since they are usually seen as part of the broader civil society and 
community-based organizations (CSOs and CBOs) framework.  However, in East Africa, 
women are very much engaged in small business enterprises.  
Article 121 of the EAC II’s treaty explicitly recognizes the role of women and 
their ability to make a significant contribution to socio-economic transformation and 
sustainable growth; their full participation in the community at the institutional level is 
seen as imperative. It is for that reason that Lwaitama, Kasombo and Mkumbo
113
 have 
underlined the importance accorded to the word “women” in the treaty, wherein it is 
mentioned 20 times, a frequency only rivaled by the mention of “private sector” (22 
times). On the other hand, the terminology “civil society” appears13 times in the treaty, 
and “citizens” 5 times.
114
 
It is ironical that, despite “women” being accorded such prominence in the treaty, 
they still lack organized participation in the affairs of the community as a unified gender 
group. However, Lwaitama, Kasombo and Mkumbo
115
 may have hinted to part of the 
explanation for the dire state of affairs. The authors argued that, despite women’s 
involvement in business in the respective individual countries of the EAC, where the 
community and cross-border trade are concerned, women’s involvement has remained 
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informal, mainly manifested either in smaller scale or illegal cross-border trading. This 
has resulted in women’s participation not featuring prominently as a net cross-border 
contribution.  
This line of argument is supported by Masheti Masinjila,
116
 whose research study 
on the gender dimensions of cross border trade within the EAC came to a similar 
conclusions that, the participation of women in regional cross-border trade had not been 
affected in any way by the adoption of the Customs Union.
117
 Masinjila’s argues that: 
…informal cross border women traders across the region do not use available 
formal systems/structures for most of their transactions. This makes it difficult for 
regional trade policy initiatives such as under East African Community (EAC) 
and the Customs Protocol to have any significant impact on this informal trade by 
women. The women show little evidence of knowledge regarding the East African 
Community Customs Protocol and even less motivation to use it to facilitate 
trading activities. Women traders continue to trade, largely the same way they 
have done for many decades gone by as admitted by [the] majority of respondents 
who have been in the trade for over ten years. Preference for the old way of 
conducting informal cross border trade was evident in the manner in which 
women traders operating through Kenya for a considerable period of time 
expressed their doubts or outright discomfort with the opening up of trade under 
the evolving customs protocol…
118
   
 
What is even more interesting is Masinjila’s finding that cross-border traders, including 
women who were interviewed, expressed their desire that governments not open up more 
region-wide trade opportunities as a result of the customs union protocol because it 
would “attract more traders eager to take advantage of attendant opportunities to the 
detriment of current traders.”
119
 Views like this may perhaps have not existed 10 years 
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after the re-establishment of the EAC, if the community had remained true to its charter 
and ensured a truly broad-based people-centered approach to integration.  
 In addition, where EAC women traders are concerned, Masinjila’s study noted 
that the majority of those interviewed (59.7%) conceded that their cross-border trade 
linkages, like those of many generations before them, remained only informal, based 
either on their ethnic origins across the border or on mutual social needs, such as the 
traders’ needs to send their children to cheaper schools in the neighboring country, for 
example in Kenya education costs are higher than in neighboring Uganda.
120
  
Civil Society/Community Based Organizations Participation in EAC Institutional 
Processes 
Even though the EAC II charter has a seemingly straightforward objective of 
incorporating civil society into the EAC II decision- making, actual implementation 
remains limited. This reality has been bemoaned by Lwaitama et al, who have argued that 
the difficulty of incorporating CBOs and other non-governmental organizations into the 
EAC institutional processes does not only manifest itself at the regional level, but stems 
from the partner states’ local environment. Using Tanzania as an example, the authors 
argue that, where these groups exist and try to exert influence locally, they are mostly 
elitist and urban-based, without the ability or will to reach the rural areas where the 
majority of the population are.
121
  
An additional problem is that EAC II member states legally limit the operations of 
CSOs in their countries. In the case of Tanzania, for example, the Non-Government 
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Organizations Act No.24 of 2002 and Societies Act Cap.337, R.E. 2002 all limit the 
activities of CSOs and CBOs by broadly requiring them to abstain from being partisan to 
any political party or position, in the course of their advocacies. Contravention of that 
regulation is risky for the CSO or CBO concerned as any of them so accused, usually 
faces de-registration.
122
 Based on that legal stipulation against CSOs and CBOs therefore, 
any campaigns they may wish to conduct in relation to the attainment of the East African 
political federation or the fast tracking of the community, would be deemed “political.” It 
is therefore not surprising that, like their gender counterparts, CSOs and CBOs have not 
featured prominently enough in EAC efforts to attain or fast track the federation.  
In the next chapter, I discuss one attempt by the partner states in 2004 to solicit 
the views of the broader population specifically on the possibility of fast tracking the 
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                                                        CHAPTER FIVE 
Establishment of the Wako Committee as a Non-institutionalized  
Attempt to People-centeredness 
In August 2004, the EAC II Summit decided that the East African Federation 
should be fast tracked. This decision was not novel, given the fact that formation of the 
EAC I in 1967 had only come about as a result of the failure of the Nairobi Declaration of 
1963, which had sought to establish an East African Political Federation.  
What factors led to this decision in 2004? Dani Wadada Nabudere provides some 
explanations regarding the new dynamics. Nabudere’s argument is that the “fast tracking” 
idea had come from Uganda’s President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, who had suddenly 
developed a ‘’vision’’ that the federation and integration of the region had to occur before 
he retired.”
123
 Museveni’s pronouncements had been quoted in the public media for some 
time. Importantly, the Summit reached the decision to fast track but wanted to explore 
how best it would be achieved. The leadership decided to form a committee, tasking 
Kenya’s Attorney General, Amos Wako, to head it. 
The Wako Committee on fast tracking the East African Federation was thus 
formed during the extraordinary Summit meeting of the EAC Heads of State held in 
Nairobi on August 27–29, 2004. At the meeting, Presidents Mwai Kibaki, Yoweri 
Museveni and Benjamin Mkapa of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, respectively, decided 
that it would be good to accelerate the process of integration in order to achieve the 
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“ultimate goal of political federation through a fast track mechanism.”
124
 Among the 
Wako Committee’s terms of reference (TORs) was the requirement to discern the 
“feelings” of the broader population of East Africa on the possibility of fast tracking the 
federation. The Summit also requested that the Committee submit its report for 
consideration within three months. The report was submitted on November 30, 2004.
125
  
Records of the Wako Committee’s work show that it consulted, via interviews, 
with all three EAC heads  of state, ministers, permanent secretaries and senior officials 
from all three EAC governments. The Committee also consulted academicians, 
parliamentarians and members of the East African Legislative Assembly (EALA), civic 
leaders, representatives of EAC business communities, and “ordinary” (sic!) East 
Africans.”
126
 What is most important is the fact that, along with the expected respondents 
from the political and bureaucratic elites, the Wako Committee also consulted with 
“ordinary” East Africans.
127
This would be the first ever large-scale broad consultation of 
its kind; it deserves that recognition.  
Composition of the Wako Committee  
The Wako Committee was chaired by Mr. Amos Wako (Attorney General of the 
Republic of Kenya at the time) and included Prof. Haidari Amani (Tanzania as the Vice 
Chairman and Dr. Ezra Suruma (Uganda) as Secretary. The presidents also appointed 
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The Wako Report’s Conclusions and Recommendations 
The Wako Committee submitted its report to the ordinary session of the Summit 
in Arusha, Tanzania, on November 30, 2004. In the voluminous 378-page report, the 
committee provided a lengthy expose on what plagued EAC II integration, and proposed 
what would be done to correct it. I discuss some of the Committee’s conclusions and 
recommendations in brief.  
Firstly, the Committee argued in its report that a sound foundation was required 
for the EAC II in order to build a sustainable federation. To achieve that, the federation 
needed to be based on both the popular support of the majority of East Africans and on a 
sound regional economic base. Only then, it was argued, would East Africans identify 
with the federation as their own, enabling the organization’s survival.
129
   
Thus the Wako committee members remained convinced of the necessity for 
people-centeredness to remain at the center of the EAC II integration process. The 
Committee also advised that, in order to attain popular support for the federation, the 
partner states should endeavor to hold referenda, whose objective would be to “sensitize 




Secondly, the Wako report called for rectification of anomalies found in the 
relationships exhibited by some of the key institutions of the EAC II, especially the 
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EALA and the East African Court of Justice (EACJ). For the EALA, the problem 
remained that partner states could elect the members of the institution from each state in 
accordance with Article 50 of the treaty but not use a uniform rule in doing so.
131
 As we 
saw in the last chapter, ultimately, the EALA members, being elected to office through 
their respective national parliaments are not accountable to the public, but to the national 
assemblies. In the case of the EACJ, the non-binding character of its decisions was cause 
for concern.  This was due to the stipulation under Article 27(1) of the Treaty that the 
EACJ was only for initial jurisdiction on matters concerning the EAC II.
132
 This left the 
final jurisdiction of referrals to national courts instead of the EACJ. The lack of 
commitment by the partner states in that regard remained problematic.  
 
The Wako Committee’s report proposed a specific timeline and phases within 
which it thought it would be possible to attain the federation. It was envisaged that a 
maximum of 5 years was needed to realize the feat, based on three phases. The first 
phase, a prelude phase (2004-5), required a display of the political will to federate by the 
EAC II leadership. Given the fact that the leadership had demonstrated that when it 
formed the committee, the Wako Report concluded that the prelude phase would hardly 
span more than one year.
133
 The second phase was to be a transitional phase (2006-2009). 
This entailed systemic implementation of the three core remaining stages of integration 
before attaining the federation: a Customs Union, a Common Market and Monetary 
Union. The three stages would be attained quickly in an “overlapping and parallel” 
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fashion, especially because they all depended on the need for the partner states to 
harmonize their economic and fiscal policies and as well as governance and 
administrative structures.  
The report further argued that success in economic integration would provide the 
foundation to achieve the federation. Hence concurrent regional programs had to be 
undertaken in the areas of infrastructural development, science and technology, as well as 
constitutional and financial aspects. The Report went on to forecast that the East African 
Political Federation could be launched by January 1, 2010, when the first federal 
president would be sworn in.
134
 The last phase, a consolidation phase (2010-2013) would 
follow the swearing in of the East African federal president. During this phase, a federal 
electoral system would be put in place, enabling the Federal State of East Africa to fully 
discharge its local and international responsibilities.
135
  
In its conclusions, the Wako Committee gave the rationale for the establishment 
of a fast tracked federation as two-fold: One, that it would be a “catalyst for economic 
growth,” and two, that it would serve as a “major pillar for the attainment and 
maintenance of peace, political stability and security in the member states.”
136
 The 
Committee further argued that the federation would avert the possibility of East African 
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Collection of Views on fast tracking from East Africans through National 
Consultation Committees (NCC) 
In the aftermath of the submission of the Wako Report to the Summit in 
November 2004, the political leadership decided that it would need wider consultations 
with the people of East Africa in order to go ahead with fast tracking the federation. The 
consultations would help the EAC II leadership to get the necessary political support 
from their citizens, at the respective national levels.  
During their Extraordinary Summit meeting in May 2005 at Dar es Salaam, 
therefore, the EAC II presidents instructed the Council of Ministers to establish National 
Consultative Committees (NCC) on fast tracking the East African federation. The EAC 
Secretary-General would chair the effort. The partner states (Kenya, Tanzania and 
Uganda) launched their NCC simultaneously on 13
th
October 2006, tasking them to 
submit their reports by November 2008. The following discussion analyses the NCC 
consultation outcomes.   
Composition of the NCC 
 The overall composition of the NCC generally differed from one country to 
another, without uniform criteria. As a result, where Kenya’s NCC membership totaled 
33 persons (28 males, 5 females), Tanzania’s total stood at 18 persons (12 males, 6 
females) and Uganda’s stood at 19 people (14 males, 5 females). Table 5.1 (below) 





Table 5.1: Composition of the NCC for Each Partner State 
Country Total No. of 
Members per NCC 
       Male 
(By head count) 
     Female 
(By head count) 
Kenya            33          28         5 
Tanzania            18          12          6 
Uganda            19          14          5 
Source: EAC Secretariat, Reports from the National Consultative Committees on Fast 
Tracking the East African Political Federation, August 2007. 
 
 
The NCCs varied in their scope of work from one partner state to another, each 
national authority making its decisions based on its own local conditions. For that reason, 
while the general methodological approach to the consultations can be discussed, issues 
pertaining to statistical significance and errors will be ignored. In addition, because each 
country conducted the consultations in a different way, it is difficult to compare them in 
terms of the breadth of consultations. However even accounting for population size, 
Tanzania seems to have drawn the largest proportion of participants. Below, Table 5.2 
depicts a summary of the scope and methods of the consultations carried out in each 
country. 
Table 5.2: Summary of Scope and Methods of Consultations by the NCC 
Kenya  Tanzania  Uganda  





a. Household survey: Nil a. Household survey:  
2,505 Targeted, 2,223 
Responded.  
b. Public meetings: Nil. b.Public meetings: 426 
Meetings; 65,379 
participants.  







participants in 32 
targeted Districts. 
c. Regional Distribution:  
All 26 Regions covered. 
c. Regional Distribution:  
Central 29.54%; Eastern, 
21.57%; Northern, 24.9% 
Western, 24.0%. (Urban 
56.46%, Rural, 43.54%. 
Gender: 56% Female, 44% 
Male). 
   
d. Memoranda:  
123 from General 
Public, 26 from sector 
groups. 
d. Memoranda: 
15 from organized 
groups and individuals 
d. Memoranda:  
18 from organized groups 
and individuals 
e. Focus Group 
Discussions (FGDs): 
80 Discussions with 29 
Groups involving 2,922 
participants and 500 
Questionnaires 
e. Focus Group 
Discussions (FGDs): 
Nil 
e. Focus Group Discussions 
(FGDs):53 
f. TV/Radio Talk 
Shows:  
21 TV and 12 Radio 
shows. 
 
f. TV/Radio Talk Shows: 
   58 contributions 
f. TV/Radio Talk Shows: 
   Several in all districts and 
major towns. 
 
g. Special programs: 
    School Broadcast 
Program, covering - 





g. Special programs: 
     Nil 
g. Special programs: 
Tertiary institutions, public 








Responses: 307 Articles 
and letters. 
h. Newspapers Responses: Nil. 
i. Internet: Nil.  i. Internet: 61 
contributions. 
i. Internet: Nil. 
j. Key informants: Nil.  
 
j. Key informants: Nil. 
 
j. Key informants: 214. 
 
Source: EAC Secretariat, Reports from the National Consultative Committees on Fast 






Key Findings from the NCC Consultations 
The consultations across the partner states lasted from 2006 through 2008, the 
NCC findings are summarized in Table 5.3 below:  
Table 5.3: Summary of Key Findings by the National Consultative Committees on 
Fast Tracking East Africa Political Federation 
 
Question Awareness/Support Kenya Tanzania Uganda 










3 Level of support for Political 
Federation 
85.4% 66.5% 88.2% 
4 Level of support for fast 
tracking the 








5 Level of support for fast 
tracking the 







Source: EAC Secretariat, Reports from the National Consultative Committee on Fast 
Tracking the East African Political Federation, August 2007. 
 
General Analysis of the NCC Findings  
Looking at the level of awareness about EAC integration, as displayed in 
Question No.1 of Table 5.3, the majority of East Africans who participated in the 
consultations seemed to be relatively aware of the EAC II’s integration processes; with 
percentages ranging from 80.2% for Tanzania, through Uganda’s 82.1% to Kenya’s 
above 90%. On the other hand, on Question No.2 (Level of support for integration) there 
was a remarkable disparity in perceptions. Where Tanzania’s support for integration 
stood at 57.9%, Kenya’s was above 90% and Uganda’s was 74.2%.  This may be 
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indicative of how each country’s sample population perceived the benefits their countries 
were gaining from the integration.  
On the Question of “support for political federation” (No.3), however, there was 
a significant change in the perceptions of Tanzanians compared to the level of support for 
fast tracking. Support for the political federation in Tanzania increased to 66.5%, while in 
Kenya support stood at 85.4% and Uganda 88.2%.  
On Question No.4 (Support to Fast Tracking the Political Integration Process - 
All stages), it is interesting to note that Kenya’s support was the lowest at 69.9%(recall 
that its support for integration was above 90%), followed by Tanzania’s at 74.4%, and 
Uganda displayed the highest at 77.6%. From the data, it appears that citizens in all the 
three states supported, with a majority, fast-tracking the political integration process 
through the various stages.  
On the other hand, on Question No.5 the results seem to be the most alarming in 
that Tanzania’s support for fast tracking the EAC political federation only was low at 
25.4%. Moreover, Uganda’s support at 56.3% (although above 50%) was not high 
enough to match the unrelenting advocacy for fast tracking the political federation that 
President Yoweri Museveni had continued to herald. It is also equally notable that 
Kenya’s support for fast tracking the political federation, which stood at 64.9%, was the 
country’s lowest level of support in all the five questions under analysis. 
The point of contention regarding East Africans’ level of support for the 
federation seems to have been centered on the rationale for fast tracking. Tanzania’s low 
percentage brought much backlash against Tanzania from the other partner states. 
However, on deeper analysis, one may note that the other two states too displayed the 
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lowest support for fast tracking the federation (Kenya at 64.9% and Uganda at 56.3%) 
when compared to what they had displayed on the other four factors. Still, Tanzania’s 
outright rejection of fast tracking the political federation needs to be better understood. In 
that regard, Tanzania’s President Jakaya Kikwete, speaking on the outcome of the NCC 
consultations in October 2011, argued: 
…Unfortunately, the views expressed by the people of Tanzania have widely been 
misunderstood to mean that they are against East African Federation. This is not 
the case. In fact, more Tanzanians supported the Federation than any of the three 
East African countries... But fewer Tanzanians supported fast tracking than their 





President Kikwete’s center of argument is that, Tanzanians do not want to fast 
track the political federation, but want the EAC to continue in its step by step integration 
process, going into the next stage when all the conditions have been met in the previous 
stage.  
However, with the responses for Tanzania in Question No.2 (Level of support for 
integration) recorded at only 57.9% in comparison to Kenya’s “above 90%” and 
Uganda’s 74.4%, respectively, it appears indicative that, although Tanzanians may not 
indeed completely reject EAC integration, they still may not be as enthusiastic about it as 
their counterparts in the rest of the partner states. Whether or not that state of perception 
changes and in what direction depends, I argue, on the degree to which the population 
continues to participate in shaping the finer points relating to the integration.    
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From a methodological standpoint, one may wish to look at the population area 
coverage, i.e. from where the respondents were drawn. Table 5.4 (below) provides a 
snapshot of that data.  
Table 5.4: Coverage of National Consultations by Regions and Districts 
 
































Source: EAC Secretariat, Reports from the National Consultative Committees on Fast 
Tracking the East African Political Federation, August 2007. 
 
Of the three partner states involved in the NCC exercise, Tanzania had the 
broadest coverage. It involved all of its 26 administrative regions and administrative 
districts (137 in total) of the time. This compares to Kenya’s 8 provinces and 108 
districts, from which the NCC in that country only drew samples from 69 districts. 
Uganda’s population sample was even much smaller. Considering the country’s 4 
administrative regions (Northern, Central, Western, and Eastern) and a total of 111 
districts, the NCC in Uganda had access to only 82 districts and the population sample 
was drawn from only 17 districts.  
 Whereas Tanzania’s consultations involved 65,379 participants in 426 meetings, 
with a survey conducted involving 9,519 respondents, Kenya’s involved only 5,000 
households and 2,556 participants in the regional consultations to mention the largest 
group of respondents. Uganda’s conduct of consultations involved an even smaller group 
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of 2,223 respondents to a survey questionnaire and 214 “key informants” of undisclosed 
spatial or interest values.   
It therefore appears to be that, in line with President Kikwete’s argument, the 
number of total respondents may have been higher in Tanzania compared to the other two 
states. In that regard, the 25% of the respondents in Tanzania appearing to not be in favor 
of fast tracking the political federation really seems to convey the idea that lack of 
support could be broad enough across the population. I will therefore explore possible 
explanations why that many Tanzanians may have been against fast tracking the 
federation. 
                                The Challenge of “Territorial Nationalism”  
 In an attempt to explain why the federation was not happening fast enough as 
expected from a reading of the EAC II treaty, Dani Wadada Nabudere argued that 
territorial nationalism
139
 is one of the challenges that continue to hold the partner states 
back from achieving the federation. Tanzania’s case requires more analysis of the 
territorial nationalistic factor.  The factor includes the country’s system of land tenure, 
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Land Tenure System 
 Tanzania’s system of land tenure is lease based, whereby a company or individual 
cannot own land in perpetuity but would have to lease it, conditional on ensuring 
effective development of the land. That land tenure system is different from freehold 
systems employed by the other two partner states. The latter system ensures perpetual 
land ownership for individuals and/or companies, regardless of whether land is developed 
or remains undeveloped. For that reason, Pastory Nguvu has argued that the majority of 
Tanzanians believe that fast tracking the federation may have the negative impact of 
providing a potential for land grabbing by foreigners.
140
 
Negative Effect of Ethnicity in Kenya and Uganda 
 Some parts of the Tanzanian public seem to believe that negative ethnicity is 
among the most portent problems facing their neighbors and has led them into civil wars. 
In reality, both Kenya and Uganda have had their share of the problem. Uganda was 
dogged by civil war, which involved the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in its Northern 
region for more than 20 years. Kenya on the other hand faced widespread post-electoral 
ethnic violence in 2007-2008. Tanzania has more than 153 ethnic groups who continue to 
live together in harmony.  
Mohabe Nyirabu has pointed out the paranoia expressed by some Tanzanians that 
federating with countries whose populations are already used to violent ethnic politics is 
akin to importing the same into Tanzania.
141
 An observation in The Sunday Standard 
(Kenya) quoting Tanzanians in an internet-based focus group on fast tracking the 
federation in 2006 may elaborate on the seriousness of that perception:  
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…Most Tanzanians are afraid that their country risks being infected with ethnicity 
problems that characterize politics in Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi… 
people from the four enemy (sic!) countries who they deride to be … washenzi 






The case of Zanzibar is another challenge. The Isles, which are part of the United 
Republic of Tanzania, have had historical opposition to the possibility of an East African 
federal state. The opposition aims to avert Zanzibar’s possibility of being subsumed into 
the (Tanzania) Union Government, where the country would lose its semi-autonomous 
status. It is envisioned that a similar fate would face Zanzibar under a regional 
federation.
143
 An account in a regional newspaper, The East African, also alludes to that 
concern: 
Zanzibar need(s) to be accorded at least an associate membership in the 
community, in order to participate in decisions that affected the Isles…This (is) 
because Zanzibar was [allegedly] excluded from the talks that led to the 
[establishment of the] East Africa Custom Union [in 2005] despite the common 




More extreme views have even suggested that Zanzibar’s right to opt out of the 
EAC II arrangement would not be different from that of Denmark and Greenland which, 
“being a region within the Danish Kingdom chose not to be part of the European 
Union.”
145
 All those factors seem to make the case for Tanzania’s only 25% support to 
fast tracking the federation rather plausible. 
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Challenges to the EAC II Leadership in absence of people-centered decisions 
The NCC consultations, while not intended to illustrate the involvement of people 
institutionally, seem to have yielded valuable insights on the potential for the 
population’s participation in determining and shaping the EAC agenda for integration. 
Initially, the EAC political leadership had intended to fast track the federation so it would 
have become a reality by 2010, but it has not happened. The lack of favorable public 
opinion in that regard could have contributed to the non-occurrence.  
Furthermore, it is notable that resistance to fast tracking the federation per se did 
not denote denial of the whole integration idea, including the possibility of fast tracking 
all the stages of integration but rather of just the political federation. The NCC 
consultations data thus provides invaluable information, which remains useful for the 
future analysis of the trajectory for EAC II integration.  
The central question that remains however is what format or mechanism is best 
suited to ensure that the people of East Africa have the opportunity to really drive the 
pace of integration, based on the material conditions they are in. Providing proper 
answers to this question may enable the EAC II to eventually not only attain people-
centeredness, but also lead to the achievement of the political federation that has 
remained elusive to-date. In the next and final chapter to this study, I conclude by 
providing suggestions on how the EAC II could move towards achieving those 
objectives.  




         CHAPTER SIX 
                                               Conclusions  
This study has examined whether the principle of people-centeredness espoused 
in the EAC II is being operationalized in a way that could enable the attainment of the 
organization’s ultimate goal for integration, namely, a political federation.
146
 The study 
was premised on the hypothesis that wider involvement of major stakeholders (“people 
centeredness”) is necessary for the successful attainment of envisaged integration 
objectives.  
The study’s central argument was that, if the people of East Africa do not have a 
role in the process of EAC II integration and the political leadership continues to retain a 
top-down approach as was the case in the EAC I, then the EAC II is likely to collapse 
eventually, not unlike its predecessor, which collapsed in 1977.
147
 That reality seems to 
continue with the EAC II. The study expresses doubts on the eventual end state of the 
Community, as long as it remains inadequately people-centered.   
Liberal Intergovernmentalism as the Study’s Theoretical Underpinning 
To provide theoretical focus, the study sought to utilize a liberal inter-
governmentalist theoretical framework. The main focus of the framework is that 
integrating states can only bring to the negotiation table the preferences of their national 
principal stakeholders for the integration to succeed. With the partner states’ negotiations 
ideally based on their principal stakeholders (national) preferences, outcomes obtaining 
from that engagement will have the stakeholders’ support.  
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In order to achieve its analytical objective, the study examined the functioning 
and decision-making orientation of the main organs of the EAC II for indications that 
they have incorporated, within their processes, the primacy of people-centeredness. 
Having found only limited institutional incorporation of people-centeredness (via civil 
society reports to various organs including the Court of Justice)  further examination was 
undertaken of initiatives undertaken outside the usual EAC II institutional decision-
making processes, which would evidence inclusion of people-centeredness.  
The establishment of the Wako Committee was used as an example of initiatives 
made outside the usual EAC II institutional channels. The Summit requested the 
Secretariat to undertake region-wide consultations about fast tracking EAC integration. 
The Wako Report led to the establishment of National Consultation Committees (NCCs) 
which sought popular view points on fast tracking the integration process. It may be fair 
to conclude that the NCC consultations exercise may have managed to stall the prospects 
for fast tracking for some time in as much as support for fast tracking toward a federation 
was relatively low. There is however still room in the future for the fast tracking to occur, 
provided the partner states endeavor to develop programs that would convince their 
citizens of the benefits of deepening EAC II integration.  
 In order to determine the extent of popular involvement in the organization, as 
advocated under Article 7 of the EAC II Treaty, I first examined the rationale for the 
inclusion of the concept in the current organization since it was not part of the integration 
process during the era of the EAC I. Although the adoption of the concept of people-
centeredness aimed to address the top-down decision-making character of the EAC I, 
which contributed to its collapse, it appears that the insertion of the concept in the EAC II 
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charter has not resulted in a fundamental shift from the top-down decision making of the 
EAC I. More efforts therefore are required to make the incorporation of people-
centeredness into the EAC II’s institutional decision-making processes a reality.   
 
The study also took note of consultations on fast tracking the EAC II political 
federation, which were conducted throughout the EAC II from 2006 to 2008. The 
exercise helped to build a body of evidence both on how the people’s views can be 
aggregated outside the EAC II’s institutional mechanisms and how people-centeredness 
as a concept requires demystifying. While contributing to stalling the impetus of fast 
tracking the political federation, the exercise also helped to shed light on the need to 
further institutionalize mechanisms for involvement of the population into the regional 
integration processes, in effect ensuring that the processes are really people-centered. 
The Role of People-centeredness 
The stronger a particular national population’s interest is in deepening integration 
the more impetus a relevant government will have to push its national interests at the 
regional level, simply because the government enjoys the popular legitimacy to do so. 
Having attained the necessary legitimacy to push ahead with a particular stage in a 
regional integration arrangement, the partner states’ governments may no longer have to 
worry about the fate of decisions they make at the regional level, because they will have 
their electorate’s support.  
On the other hand, unless each individual EAC II government sees that they had 
something to lose from their principal stakeholders -the people- they will continue to act 
only in line with their own whims. If the contrary were true and popular pressure really 
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became a determinant of integration, it would reduce the likelihood that political leaders 
would maintain the current top-down approach to integration. In other words, where a 
robust public perception for or against integration exists among a country’s population, 
the potential to make political leaders losers vis-à-vis the interests of their respective 
populations becomes too high to risk not being re-elected by going counter to the 
perceived popular will.   
On the other hand, as a concept, people-centeredness requires demystification, as 
it is also prone to abuse by unscrupulous politicians who may wish to employ statistics 
showing popular views to justify top-down decision-making on regional integration. For 
example, it is difficult to compare the level of support for fast tracking in the three 
countries studied because each country approached the consultations differently. 
Tanzanian views were presented in terms of numbers of meetings conducted (426) and 
number of participants (65,379), number of questionnaires which were administered 
(9,519) and the specificity of gender distribution in the same and the like. In Uganda’s 
case, however, the results were broken-down by rural/urban origins, gender, regional 
origin and economic status. While both methods are valid, comparison are difficult. 
 Consequently, to provide a clear view of popular support, changes in 
methodology are desirable. Otherwise, an outcome can be heralded as having come out of 
a people-centered collection process, when in fact it may not necessarily be 
representative of the population. 
Finally one may ask whether it is more important to reach out to the people than 
to develop programs for their economic development. Certainly both are necessary. 
However as many a scholar’s arguments have demonstrated in this study, the utility of 
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people-centeredness as a concept cannot be disregarded. Sengondo Mvungi attests to the 
usefulness of the concept when he argues that, the collapse of the EAC I in 1977 came as 
no surprise to the majority of the people of East Africa because they had had no say in 
what was taking place in the EAC I.
148
 Thus, the “collapse, though regrettable, drew very 
little sympathy from East Africans.”
149
  Similarly, ensuring popular legitimacy for EAC 
II regional integration is important. Given the potential of regional integration to change 
the livelihoods of whole populations across the partner states, it requires the broadest 
support from the population, in order to justify its implementation. 
Parliament’s Legitimatizing Role on Regional Integration 
In terms of EAC II institutions, East Africa’s national parliaments represent the 
broader sections of their societies from a democratic standpoint. However, there is so far 
no evidence that they have been adequately involved in debating progress in the various 
stages of integration. This is a missed opportunity because, if the EAC governments and 
leaders were to decide to bring about their visions concerning proposed integration 
trajectories, parliaments could serve as an initial point of entry for integration proposals 
to be debated and eventually reach the general public for debate and decision. If the EAC 
governments and leaders were to lobby their national parliaments more in advocating for 
deeper integration, including fast tracking the federation, they would perhaps be able to 
demystify some of the negative perceptions coming out of the debate on the rationale for 
fast tracking. Instead, the governments do not seem to have seized opportunities to 
address some of the criticisms generally leveled against the fast tracking idea, such as 
President Museveni’s alleged personal ambition to become the first East African 
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president. Such negative perceptions have not really been tackled; they have only 
continued to be discussed in passing, without the portrayal of an actual “reality.” 
In the Tanzania parliament, for example, some Members of Parliament (MPs) 
opposed fast tracking the federation based on news media reports that President 
Museveni had said his “desire was to see the East African Federation before his 
retirement.” It was a negative allegation to which the government did not have an 
opportunity to respond properly in order to counter the scare mongering already 
circulating through the mass media.  
Apart from institutional changes, a possible avenue for enshrining people-
centeredness in EAC II integration which is yet to be employed is that of holding national 
referenda to let the public decide whether a particular facet or stage of integration is in 
their interest. This would prevent the political leadership from moving on blindly while 
assuming that they have the support of their peoples when in reality they do not. 
Adopting referenda on such potentially far reaching integration decisions can lend 
legitimacy to the Summit’s proposals.  
People-centeredness crucial element for reality check on integration 
This study has consistently argued that, when properly utilized, people-
centeredness has the potential to not only ensure continued popular support to the 
regional integration project, but also to contribute to the conditions necessary for the 
integration arrangement to remain sustainable. It is not the only condition but it is a 
necessary one because politics alone will not ensure the success of integration. This does 
not mean that political leadership must be proactive. However, political leadership needs 
to be there to only ensure direction and to foster support to the integration process. On the 
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other hand, the absence of a people-centered element is likely to make the integration 
moribund in the longer term.  
Thus, although people-centeredness has not been adequately incorporated into the 
integration process; there is still room for re-organization and expansion of the 
mechanisms for popular involvement in the integration processes. The EAC II needs to 
re-align itself accordingly, to make the long term investments already put into the 
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